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SUMMARY
Canada Post’s lettermail volumes are plummeting, largely due to the explosion of 
electronic communication, with no evident sign of stabilizing. E-commerce parcel 
deliveries are on the rise, but not nearly at the rate necessary to offset the decline in 
lettermail, and there are many private courier companies competing for that business. 
Meanwhile, even as the number of Canadian home addresses continues to increase, 
Canada Post’s plan to end the remnants of door-to-door home delivery, had to be 
halted in light of the new Liberal government’s promise to maintain the service. The 
extraordinary disruption that electronic media has caused to the model of state-
owned postal services, with their mandate to provide universal delivery, may seem 
dire. And the threat is indeed urgent. But there are solutions to help Canada Post 
remain healthy in reforms that have occurred to postal systems elsewhere. 
This does not necessarily mean immediate privatization (although that has been 
achieved with some success in Europe): The burden of universal service obligations in 
a country as expansive and minimally populated as Canada is, could make it difficult 
for the government to realize appropriate value in selling Canada Post. But if the 
Liberal government intends to help Canada Post endure in this environment, it should 
allow the corporation to introduce some basic elements of competition and market-
based reform.
The reality is that most Canadian mail today is sent by large firms to customers and 
other businesses. And most mail is delivered in urban areas, where delivery costs are 
lowest. But because Canada Post is required to charge identical prices to all customers, 
urban households essentially help subsidize the postage costs of big business and 
rural recipients. This need not be the case: Canada Post would be more successful if 
it could charge varying rates (capped at a maximum) based on the type of sender, 
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2volume, and the mail’s destination. One could also imagine scenarios where recipients pay an 
annual fee for different levels of service, paying extra for door-to-door delivery for example.
Canada Post currently allows its clients to compete with it for the sortation of mail (offering 
discounts for firms willing to pre-sort mail), and there is much more room for competition in 
the collection, transport and sorting of mail. Already, it is likely that Canada Post has too many 
sorting facilities, given the advent of new sorting technologies; outsourcing certain upstream 
operations could help it further reduce its infrastructure and labour costs. There is also a case 
to be made for Canada Post reducing its delivery frequency and delivery times, especially in 
higher-cost rural areas. Surveys indicate that Canadians would be fine with that.
Allowing competition in delivery, on the other hand, comes with risks of rivals willing to snap 
up delivery routes in dense urban networks, leaving Canada Post with an even less profitable 
model in being left to deliver its (and competitors’) products in only high-cost areas. This can 
be offset, however, by requiring competitors to assume some of the incumbent’s universal 
service obligations, or at least paying a tax to compensate Canada Post for its obligations.
Ensuring these reforms remain compatible with the financial viability of the incumbent would 
be helped by setting up an independent regulator to ensure the maintenance of a level 
playing field and to separate the influence of politics from decision-making. In the current era, 
however, the idea that universal service obligations should be exclusive to mail carriers seems 
antiquated. It is only rational that the independent regulator be charged with overseeing that 
universal service obligations are shared between telecom services and mail services.
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41. INTRODUCTION
The postal sector is at a crossroads everywhere in the world. It increasingly competes with 
other industries, such as media and telecommunications, as can be seen from the large 
and persistent fall in letter volumes in all advanced economies since the mid-2000s. The 
sector has also been reorganized recently in several parts of the world, including the U.S. 
and the European Union, to introduce more competition while ensuring the viability of the 
universal-service obligations faced by the incumbent postal operator. Canada Post is also 
faced with the same technological evolutions, and made front-page news with its decision to 
put an end to door-to-door delivery.1
This paper concentrates on the lettermail business of the postal operators. Postal operators 
are also active in other areas, mostly parcels, but also express courier. Many postal 
operators throughout the world also offer banking services. We concentrate on lettermail 
because it represents the core of the postal operators’ businesses. For most operators, 
lettermail has long represented by far the largest share of both volumes and revenue. The 
parcels and express-courier activities differ a lot from the lettermail business. From a 
technological viewpoint, parcels and express courier do not exhibit the same characteristics 
as lettermail, with their much lower fixed costs and few if any universal-service obligations. 
As a consequence, and unlike lettermail, the parcel and express-courier markets have been 
organized competitively in most countries, with the incumbent postal operator facing a 
lot of competition. With the fall in lettermail volumes and the concurrent rise of parcels 
(thanks to the strong development of e-commerce), the share of lettermail in the activities 
undertaken by postal operators is decreasing, but with few exceptions (such as New 
Zealand Post) lettermail still currently represents the first activity of the postal incumbents. 
As we will see, this may not be true for much longer.
We start this paper by presenting the main characteristics of the postal sector. Although 
posts belong to the large category of network industries, they present very specific 
attributes, which have to be taken into account in any analysis. We first describe the postal 
activities, from collection to sorting, transport and delivery. Each of these activities has 
very specific features, with delivery comprising half of the costs and exhibiting increasing 
returns to scale. We then stress that up to 90 per cent of mail is sent by businesses 
rather than by households, and then move to a quick description of the universal-service 
obligations imposed on the postal sector throughout the world. We finish this section by 
explaining why the postal sector can be seen as a two-sided market, and why it matters.
1 At the time of writing, Canada Post had just announced it was halting the move to deliver home mail to community 
mailboxes only, to reflect a campaign promise of the newly elected Liberal government. See Carrie Tait and Les  
Perreaux, “Canada Post suspends plans to install community mailboxes,” The Globe and Mail, October 26, 2015,  
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-post-erecting-community-mailboxes-despite-liberal-delivery-
pledge/article26981780/.
5In Section 3, we present the recent evolutions in this sector, starting with changes in how it 
is organized in the European Union and in the U.S. This comparison is interesting because 
it highlights two very different routes to introduce competition in the sector. We then show 
how the sector has been affected by e-substitution, with a large decrease in letter volumes 
since the mid-2000s.
Section 4 is devoted to the Canadian postal sector. We start by describing its specific 
features and its recent evolution. The next four subsections contain our proposals for 
reform. We first talk about the necessity to reassess the universal-service obligations, since 
the extent of these obligations determines how much competition can be introduced in the 
market. We then make a case for setting up an independent regulator, whether the postal 
incumbent remains public or is privatized. We then turn to the introduction of competition, 
stressing that upstream competition is much more common everywhere in the world than 
is end-to-end competition. Finally, we discuss the arguments in favour of privatizing the 
incumbent, either at the same time that other changes are made, or later, as has been done 
in the U.K. Section 5 concludes. 
2. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POSTAL SECTOR
We start by presenting the main features of the postal-network activities. 
2.1 Postal activities and sector organization
Postal activities are composed of different segments, as illustrated in Figure 1: collection, 
local transportation, outward sortation, long-haul transportation, inward sortation, 
transportation to post office (PO) and then delivery.2 Local transportation links the 
collection points to the sortation offices. These regional sortation offices usually perform 
both outward and inward sortation, although at different times of the day. Mail is then 
transported to post offices and delivered to the addressee. 
2 Figure 1 is taken from J. Panzar, “Reconciling Competition, Downstream Access and Universal Service and Universal 
Service in Postal Markets,” in Postal and Delivery Services: Delivering on Competition (Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2002), 93–115.
6FIGURE 1 THE POSTAL-NETWORK ACTIVITIES 
1. Collection
2. Transport from local PO
3. Outward sortation
4. Intercity transport
5. Inward sortation
6. Transport to local PO
7. PO Box/Delivery
There is little if any evidence that collection, transportation and sortation present significant 
economies of scale or sunk costs3 or that they could qualify as essential facilities.4 These 
activities can therefore be organized on a competitive basis. This has been the case, for a 
long time, in many countries, including those where the incumbent is (or was) protected 
by a legal delivery monopoly. For instance, in France, the transportation activity has been 
outsourced to a competitive fringe of transport companies for a long time. In the U.S., 
where the United States Postal Service (USPS) benefits from a legal delivery monopoly, 
most of the sortation activities are done by external parties (see section 3.1.2 below).
Delivery is very different, as most economists agree that it presents significant economies 
of scale.5 These returns to scale reflect the fact that a large part of the delivery costs are 
indeed fixed—i.e., they are independent of the volumes delivered. The size of the fixed 
costs is linked to two characteristics of the sector. First, most costs are indeed labour 
costs, and these costs are usually not very flexible—at least in the short term—because of 
specific labour contracts, such as public contracts (for civil servants) or contracts with a 
heavily unionized workforce. Second, fixed costs also arise because of the constraints put 
on delivery by universal-service obligations (see section 2.3 below). The requirement to 
offer delivery of mail to every address every weekday means that it is necessary to have a 
network of delivery offices and a level of staff within them, which is largely a fixed cost. 
3 ibid.
4 M. Crew and P. Kleindorfer, “Balancing Access and the Universal Service Obligation,” in Postal and Delivery Services: 
Delivering on Competition, ed. M. A. Crew and P. R. Kleindorfer (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002), 3-32.
5 C. Rogerson and W. Takis, “Economies of Scale and Scope and Competition in Postal Services,” in Regulation and the 
Nature of Postal and Delivery Services, ed. M. A. Crew and P. R. Kleindorfer (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993); 
C. Cazals, J-P. Florens, S. Soterios, “Delivery costs for postal services in the UK: some results on scale economies with 
panel data,” in Regulatory and Economic Challenges in the Postal and Delivery Sector, ed. M.A. Crew and P.R. Kleindorfer 
(New York: Springer, 2005); M. Farsi, M. Filippini and U. Trinkner, “Economies of Scale, Density and Scope in Swiss 
Post’s Mail Delivery,” Swiss Economics Working Paper 0005 (Zurich, 2006).
7The economies of scale in the delivery activity are especially important because delivery 
costs represent roughly half of the total postal costs.6 This also explains why the postal 
sector has been organized as a monopoly for a long time in many countries. It is important 
to note right away that returns to scale in delivery differ significantly across geographical 
areas, mainly between (low-density) rural and (high-density) urban areas. This observation 
has an important impact on the type of competition observed in the postal sector. 
2.2 Most mail is sent by firms
It is important to do away with the romantic vision of manually written and stamped letters 
and recognize that up to 90 per cent of mail volumes originate from firms and governments, 
and are sent either to other firms (B2B flows) or to consumers (B2C)—see Figure 2.7 Also, 
a small number of large firms represent an important fraction of total volumes. 
FIGURE 2 2009 U.S. MAIL VOLUMES 
These large customers usually perform by themselves a large part of the postal activities, 
namely the sortation and transportation of mail to a processing centre of the postal operator. 
In exchange for performing these activities, they receive a rebate on the full retail price. 
This process is called “work-sharing” in the U.S. and “(customer direct) access” in Europe.8 
6 Farsi, Filippini and Trinkner, “Economies of.”
7 Source: Boston Consulting Group, “Projecting US Mail Volumes to 2020,” Final Report (March 2, 2010),  
https://about.usps.com/future-postal-service/bcg-detailedpresentation.pdf; 2009 U.S. mail volumes.
8 Some authors use the term “upstream access” for work-sharing, since access is given to the outward sortation facilities, 
in contrast to “downstream access” for access given to competitors to the incumbent’s delivery network (inward sortation 
centres or even delivery offices).
8This, in effect, means that postal firms are in competition with their own customers for part 
of their activity. We will come back to this most important phenomenon in section 4.4. 
2.3 Universal-service obligations
Most countries impose universal-service obligations (USO) upon postal operators. These 
involve the obligation to supply a specific package of goods and services, of a determined 
quality, to all users (i.e., ubiquity), at “affordable” rates. A uniform-pricing requirement is 
often added, as in Canada. An important component of the quality aspect is the obligation 
to deliver a certain fraction of mail within a certain amount of time (depending on the 
size of the country, one or three days after collection), and to offer a minimum frequency 
of delivery throughout the country. For instance, in the European Union, a minimum 
definition is contained in the EU directives, but can be reinforced by individual member 
countries according to the principle of subsidiarity. In Germany or France, for instance, the 
requirement concerning the delivery frequency goes beyond the minimal EU requirements 
of five days a week. Certain countries also add constraints on the number and location of 
post offices. For instance, Section 10 of the Canadian Postal Service Charter states that a 
post office must be located within 15 kilometers of 98 per cent of Canadians.
Such requirements are often imposed on the incumbent postal operator (which we will 
call, from now on, the universal-service provider, or USP) but usually not on competitors, 
who may then choose which segment (defined by product or by area) of the market they 
want to enter, and what price to post on each market segment. Such an asymmetry between 
obligations for various operators, sometimes coupled with mandatory access to the 
incumbent’s delivery network, opens the door to “cream-skimming” by entrants. We will 
come back to this important point in section 4.4.
Among the justifications given for the USO is the fact that the postal sector is a two-sided 
market. We now move to this aspect. 
2.4 Two-sided market
Network externalities are a classical justification of USO in telecommunications. They 
arise when the benefits from using a network depend on the number of individuals that 
are connected to the network. Since the number of subscribers determines the number 
of individuals any particular user can communicate with, any individual’s decision to 
subscribe or not directly affects the utility for other individuals. However, when deciding 
upon participation, any particular consumer takes only his own (private) benefits into 
account. These externalities may lead to an inefficient outcome in an unregulated market 
and have an adverse effect on the development of the network: Since individuals only take 
into account their private benefits when deciding whether to join a network, and since their 
decision generates positive externalities on others, the number of subscribers will typically 
be smaller than optimal. These inefficiencies may be reduced, through regulatory measures, 
such as USO, that promote the affordability of access to the network. 
9This traditional approach relies on a symmetric view of externalities where all subscribers 
are potentially both callers and receivers. This view is probably of limited relevance for the 
postal sector, since we have seen in section 2.2 that most mail originates from businesses, 
with individuals being much more likely to receive mail than to send it. A more modern 
approach to network externalities is provided by the “two-sided-markets” framework. 
In this setting, a market is viewed as a platform (intermediary) for exchanges between 
agents on its two sides. The membership and/or usage on one side of the market affects the 
utility or profit opportunities on the other side. This gives rise to membership and/or usage 
externalities that are no longer symmetric.9 
Beyond providing a justification for certain USO, the fact that the postal sector is a two-
sided market also has consequences for its tariff structure, as one of the messages that 
has emerged from this literature is that “membership fees” on one side of the market 
may be below cost (or even negative). Interestingly, virtually all postal operators apply a 
pre-paid mechanism, which goes back to Rowland Hill’s 1840 “uniform penny-postage 
service” proposal in the U.K. to charge only mail senders, and not directly the recipients. 
Since most mail is now sent by firms in the context of their commercial relationships with 
clients, a large fraction of these postal costs are—directly or indirectly—passed through 
to final customers.10 Anyway, one could imagine other tariff structures where the recipient 
would pay directly for part of the postal costs.11 Since frequent delivery at the doorstep is 
especially costly to the USP, one could imagine having the recipient pay for this service 
through a yearly membership fee. We will come back to this in section 4.2.
Finally, the postal sector competes with many other markets (for example, electronic 
communications) for the fulfilment of the need to transfer information from sender to 
recipient. Senders of information usually use different ways to forward information: this is 
called a “multi-homing” strategy in the literature on two-sided platforms. The competition 
from other two-sided platforms has become much more intense in the last years, as we will 
show in the next section. 
3. RECENT EVOLUTIONS WORLDWIDE
The postal sector has undergone two major evolutions recently. We first cover the changes 
in its organization in Europe and the U.S. We then move to the fall in volumes delivered 
throughout the world since the mid-2000s.
9 In other words, the traditional model of network externalities can be viewed as a special case of the two-sided approach, 
where externalities are symmetrical.
10 P. De Donder, H. Cremer, S. Soterii and S. Tobias, “Analyzing the prospects for Business Mail using a sender-recipient 
framework,” in Postal and Delivery Innovation in the Digital Economy, ed. M.A. Crew and T.J. Brennan (New York: 
Springer, 2015), chapter 25.
11 C. Jaag and U. Trinkner, “Pricing in Competitive Two-sided Mail Markets,” in Competition and Regulation in the Postal 
and Delivery Sector, ed. Michael A. Crew and Paul R. Kleindorfer (Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Edward 
Elgar, 2008), 136-149.
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3.1 Changes in ways the postal sector is organized
3.1.1 In Europe
The postal sector in Europe has been shaped by a succession of three EU directives 
(1997, 2002 and 2008). These directives have gradually liberalized postal services, while 
maintaining a minimum level of USO. In many countries, before the first directive of 
1997, the USP had been granted a monopoly on postal services, and USOs were financed 
internally. For instance, the requirement that prices be geographically uniform implied 
cross-subsidies between (costly) rural areas and (cheaper) urban areas.
The directives have set a gradual liberalization process. In a first stage, the USP was 
allowed to keep “reserved areas,” namely subsets of postal products (delineated at country 
level within weight/price limits given by the postal directives) where the USP enjoyed a 
monopoly. The profit made in these areas by the USP would allow it to fund the cost of the 
USO. In a second stage, these areas were progressively reduced, up to the point where 16 
member states had to open their postal markets fully by Dec. 31, 2010; the remaining 11 
having completed liberalization by the end of 2012. Some member states (Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom) had already fully 
opened their postal markets ahead of the EU deadline.
Competition in the postal market can take two forms: end-to-end (or infrastructure-based) 
competition (where competitors undertake all activities of the postal chain, from collection 
to delivery) or upstream competition, where competitors collect, sort and transport mail, but 
require access to the USP’s ubiquitous delivery network.
A widely held belief at the time of the adoption of the directives was that competitors 
needed to access the USP delivery network at (mandated or negotiated) terms, in order to 
climb the “ladder of investment”—i.e., acquire capital assets progressively as they build up 
a customer base and revenues. Most of the competition did indeed occur through access, but 
there is little indication that competitors are moving en masse to end-to-end competition, 
except in specific areas. The recent experience of the U.K. shows the difficulty of building a 
sizable delivery network, with the postal firm Whistl suspending deliveries after its private-
equity backer, LDC, pulled out of funding to help expand the business. The Dutch-owned 
company—formerly known as TNT—said it was reviewing the viability of rolling out its 
delivery service from the areas where it operates. Whistl employs about 2,000 workers 
in its postal delivery business in parts of London, Liverpool and Manchester in direct 
competition to the Royal Mail.
With few exceptions, the new competitors emerging from the liberalized market do not 
open post offices or install letterboxes. Instead, they pick up mail directly at the premises 
of their customers, which are mostly large corporations. As for mail delivery, they typically 
deliver only two or three days a week and only in highly populated areas.
The directives have recognized the need for strong and independent national regulators. 
These regulators have three main objectives. First, they must make sure that the incumbent 
does not abuse its remaining market power to extract high prices. In most countries, 
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regulators have imposed some form of price cap on postal incumbents.12 Second, they must 
ensure that the incumbent provides good quality access to its competitors at fair prices. 
Third, they have an obligation to ensure the financial sustainability of the USO. The 2008 
directive has indeed acknowledged that the provision of USO entails an “unfair financial 
burden” for the provider. Among other risks, opening the market to competition, while 
imposing USO on the incumbent but not on competitors, raises the possibility of cream-
skimming, where competitors target the high-density/low-cost areas. The directive then 
allows for compensation, such as public procurement procedures, public funding, or a 
shared mechanism between providers of services and/or users. Any claimed unfair financial 
burden needs to be assessed and approved by the independent national regulatory authority.
It is widely believed that, as the remaining market power of postal incumbents wanes in the 
face of competition (both postal and, more generally, media), the ex ante regulation will be 
scaled back and replaced in large part by (ex post) competition policy. Changes are still too 
recent to confirm or refute this prediction. 
The last evolution observed concerns the legal status of the postal incumbents. All 
national post companies have been transformed from state enterprises into public limited 
companies. Although EU regulation does not concern public ownership and member states 
are free to maintain publicly owned postal operators, several countries have chosen to 
privatize the incumbent postal firm. Deutsche Post is the successor to the German mail 
authority Deutsche Bundespost, which was privatized in 1995. Austria and the Netherlands 
have also privatized their national operators, and the most recent case is the privatization of 
Royal Mail in Britain. 
3.1.2 In the U.S.
The postal sector is organized very differently in the U.S.13 The United States Postal 
Service, or USPS, is an independent agency of the United States federal government, 
responsible for providing postal services in the country. It is one of the few government 
agencies explicitly authorized by the United States Constitution. It was entirely managed 
by the U.S. government before 1971. The USPS has exclusive access to letterboxes 
marked “U.S. Mail” and to personal letterboxes—i.e., it has a monopoly on the delivery of 
lettermail (although it competes with express-courier and private package-delivery services, 
such as UPS and FedEx).
On the face of it, there would seem to be much less competition in the postal sector in the 
U.S. than in Europe. This is true for end-to-end competition, but the USPS has a very long 
tradition of offering “work-sharing” discounts to those of its customers who pre-sort and 
transport their mail to a USPS delivery centre. Competition is therefore much less visible 
than in Europe, but represents a large fraction of the value added by postal services, since 
12 C. Borsenberger, S. Bréville, H. Cremer, P. De Donder and D. Joram, “Price Cap Regulation in the Postal Sector: Single 
vs. Multiple Baskets,” Multi-Modal Competition and the Future of Mail, ed. M.A. Crew and P.R. Kleindorfer (Cheltenham, 
U.K.: Edward Edgar, 2012), 195-205.
13 The following description is taken from Wikipedia, “United States Postal Service,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_
States_Postal_Service, accessed on October 20, 2015.
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roughly three-quarters of USPS domestic mail volumes are work-shared (ranging from 95 
per cent for periodicals and advertising mail to 50 per cent for first-class mail).14
While not explicitly defined, the postal service’s USO are broadly outlined in statute and 
include multiple dimensions: geographic scope, range of products, access to services and 
facilities, delivery frequency, affordable and uniform pricing, service quality, and security 
of the mail. While other carriers may claim to voluntarily provide delivery on a broad basis, 
the USPS is the only carrier with a legal obligation to provide all the various aspects of 
universal service.
The USPS is under the regulatory purview of the Postal Rate Commission (PRC), both 
entities being defined in law as independent establishments of the executive branch.15 The 
PRC was created by the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 and has exercised regulatory 
oversight to set the rates for different classes of mail by holding hearings on rates proposed 
by the USPS. From 1970 through 2006, the PRC also had oversight authority over the USPS 
in areas besides rates changes, such as service changes, through its recommendations to the 
postal governors. The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006 (PAEA) made 
several changes to the PRC, which was renamed the Postal Regulation Commission. The 
PAEA significantly strengthened the commission’s authority to serve as a counterbalance 
to new flexibility granted to the postal service in setting postal rates. The act requires the 
commission to develop and maintain regulations for a modern system of rate regulation, 
consult with the postal service on delivery-service standards and performance measures 
and prevent cross-subsidization or other anti-competitive postal practices. The law also 
assigns new and continuing oversight responsibilities to the PRC, including annual 
determinations of USPS compliance with applicable laws and review of the universal-
service requirement. New enforcement tools given to the PRC include the authority to 
direct the USPS to adjust rates and to take other remedial actions.
Beyond the differences in the way postal sectors are organized on both sides of the Atlantic, 
they have both been hit recently by a fall in volumes delivered, as we now explain. 
3.2 Fall in letter volumes delivered
A new characteristic of the sector has emerged since the mid-2000s: a structural rate of 
decline in letter volumes. This trend is now present in all countries with advanced postal 
networks. Part of these declines can be attributed to the worldwide recession, but it has 
become increasingly clear with time that a large part is due to the advent of electronic 
substitutes, and that volumes won’t return to pre-crisis levels. This new trend has forced 
postal operators to restructure and adapt their operations.
Figure 3 represents the decline in letter volumes in the five biggest markets in Europe 
(France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the U.K.) as well as in the U.S.16 Mail volumes closely 
14 M. Crew, P. Kleindorfer and J. Campbell, Handbook of Worldwide Postal Reform (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 2008).
15 The following description is taken from Wikipedia, “Postal Regulatory Commission,” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Postal_
Regulatory_Commission, accessed on October 20, 2015.
16 Source: International Post Corporation and Boston Consulting Group, “Focus on the Future: Building a new compelling 
position for posts” (June 2012).
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followed the overall level of economic activity (as measured by real GDP) until 2000. Since 
then, mail volumes have been in quasi-continuous decline. 
FIGURE 3 MAIL VOLUME DECOUPLED FROM GDP, VOLUME DECLINE IS ACCELERATING
Building a new compelling position for posts - June 2012 17
3.1  Postal operators need to adapt to declining mail volumes
1. Volumes for France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK and US. 1983-2009 (actual), 2010 – 2011 (estimated), 2012 – 2016 (forecast)
Note: Although we know some of these mail volumes include (smaller) parcels we have modelled this as if it were pure mail volumes and revenues
Source: IPC, International Monetary Fund, Eurostat, EIU, Euromonitor, BCG analysis
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Figure 1: Mail volume decoupled from GDP, volume decline is accelerating
200
150
100
83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Figure 1 presents the macro evolution of GDP and its 
relationship to mail volumes. From 1980 to 2000 mail 
volumes rose in line with GDP. While GDP rose in real 
terms over the period during and following the 2000 
dot-com crash, this marked a turning point where mail 
volume evolution decoupled from GDP evolution and 
has not paralleled it since. The stock market turmoil 
the dot-com crash engendered saw a sharp drop in 
mail volumes, which thereafter continued on their 
downward trend. The most recent recession (2008-
2009) saw another sharp drop in mail volumes and 
seems to have exacerbated that downward trend, 
pushing mail volumes into steady decline. As we have 
shown in the joint IPC-BCG publication Prepare for 
the worst, hope for the best, the impact of a new 
Figure 1: Real GDP & mail volume  
Index (1983=100) of six main countries1
recession is that operators have two fewer years for 
their transformation. In the sixth chapter we will revisit 
the forecast model and zoom into the drivers behind 
substitution.
Not only does the absolute mail volume decline, 
with the rise of digital communication and social 
media physical mail is also rapidly losing relevance. 
Measured in units of communication, its share in the 
communications market dropped from 13% in 2000 
to 1% in 20102. Without further measures relevance 
will decrease even more quickly in the following years. 
This implies that rigorous segmentation within senders, 
receivers and types of communication is required to 
define and sell the specific relevance of physical mail.
3  Manage external factor implications
2.  Communication market defined as: fixed and mobile phone calls, text messages, emails and pageviews. 90% of emails assumed to be spam and disregarded. Fixed 
and mobile call minutes divided by 1.5 (average call length) to convert minutes into calls
Acceleration
7% volume loss p.a. (~30% in 5 
years) 
In the U.S., first-class mail volume peaked in 2001 and has declined 29 per cent from 1998 
to 2008. Overall mail volum  peaked later, in 2006, and has been in decline ever since. 
The B ston Consultin  Group projected in 2010 further volume declines of at least 15 per 
cent between 2009 and 2020 (see Figure 4). This has prompted the postal service to look 
for other sources of revenue while cutting costs to reduce its budget deficit. In 2013, the 
USPS announced plans to discontinue the delivery of letters and flats on Saturdays, while 
continuing parcels d liv ry (“Plan 5+”). However the Co solidated and Further Continuing 
Appropriations Act reversed the cuts to Saturday delivery. 
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FIGURE 4 MAIL VOLUME IN THE U.S., ACTUAL (2000–2009) AND PROJECTED (2010–2020) 
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In Canada as well, the erosion in lettermail volumes has been underway since 2006: while 
Canada Post Corp. (CPC) delivered roughly five-billion pieces of domestic lettermail 
in 2006, that number has dropped to roughly 3.8 billion in 2013.17 This trend has even 
accelerated in the third quarter of 2014 with a 6.1 per cent drop. Stewart-Patterson et 
al.18 forecast a continuous decline in all categories of mail (domestic transactional mail, 
addressed ad mail, unaddressed ad mail and publications) from 2012 to 2020, with total 
volumes going down by 26 per cent over these eight years. 
There is little doubt now that this downward trend in letter volumes is mainly due to the 
advent of e-substitution. The most important question for the postal sector is whether this 
trend will continue unchanged, or even accelerate, in which case the lettermail industry will 
disappear in a few decades. The more optimistic alternative would see the volumes of mail 
stabilize, although at a much lower level than their peak. We will content ourselves here 
with listing the elements in favour, or against, the disappearance of mail. 
Any information can now be digitized and sent through telecommunication networks, 
rather than being printed and mailed. The massive spread of e-substitution has first 
necessitated general access to the telecommunication networks, mainly the Internet. 
Broadband access is now generalized, including in sparsely populated Canada: 87 per 
cent of Canadian households were connected to the Internet in 2013, making Canada the 
16th-most-connected country in the world in terms of Internet access. This represents an 
increase of seven per cent since 2010.19 This proportion will continue to increase in the near 
17 Canada Post Corporation, 2014 annual report.
18 D. Stewart-Patterson, V. Gill and C. Hoganson, “The Future of Postal Service in Canada” (Ottawa: Conference Board of 
Canada, 2013).
19 
Source: Ian Lee, “Is the Cheque Still in the Mail? The Internet, e-commerce, and the future of Canada Post Corporation” 
(MacDonald-Laurier Institute, 2015).
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future, as Industry Canada develops its program to subsidize the extension of broadband to 
all rural communities over the next five years. At the same time, a broadband connection is 
necessary but not sufficient for e-substitution to occur, since citizens must also be willing 
to use these e-substitutes. Recent analysis by International Post Corp. (IPC) and Boston 
Consulting Group (BCG)20 shows that broadband availability has historically (from 2000 
to 2008) had a strong relationship to e-substitution, but that since 2009 current Internet 
usage has been a better indicator. In other words, now that most people are connected to the 
Internet, the question becomes how (much more) willing to use e-substitutes people will 
be in the future. One can observe different trends at work. Demographic trends certainly 
play in favour of e-substitution, with younger, more Internet-savvy generations replacing 
older ones. At the same time, rising concerns about Internet piracy and privacy probably 
mean that a non-negligible fraction of the population will continue to use mail rather than 
e-substitute, at least for sensitive communication.
Direct marketing (advertising mail) represents a non-negligible fraction of revenues for 
postal operators (around 20 per cent for CPC between 2012 and 2014 according to the 
corporation’s annual reports). Digital advertising poses a threat to this postal activity. At the 
same time, physical ads (such as those received by mail) retain some advantages over their 
digital counterparts, for instance the advantage offered by a ubiquitous postal network, 
which can guarantee that all households in the country can be reached. Also, digital and 
paper are not only substitutes, but can also become complementary — for instance, a 
paper ad enticing customers to connect to the Internet to learn more about a product. More 
generally, postal operators are busy developing various sorts of hybrid mail, which take 
advantage of the complementarity between physical and digital media. 
All this being said, it is probable that, even if letter volumes stabilize, they will represent a 
much smaller level and fraction of the activity of postal operators, thanks to the growth in 
parcel volumes made possible by the development of e-commerce.
Figure 5 reports the impressive rate of growth in parcel volumes throughout Europe.21 
20 International Post Corporation and Boston Consulting Group, “Focus on,” Figure 6.
21 Downloaded from Austrian Post’s website, “The European postal market,” https://post.at/gb2009/en/Postmarkt_Europa.php 
on October 20, 2015.
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FIGURE 5 GROWTH IN PARCEL VOLUMES IN EUROPE 
The Universal Postal Union (UPU) reports that lettermail generally remained the chief 
source of income for posts in 2012—accounting for a worldwide average of 43.9 per cent 
of revenues. This despite lettermail volumes continuing their downward slide, with total 
worldwide lettermail traffic declining by an estimated 3.5 per cent to 350.9 billion items. 
Transactional and advertising mail together represented 71 per cent of CPC revenue in 
2014, down from 73 per cent in 2012,22 while parcel share increased from 22 to 24 per cent. 
So, even if parcel volumes increased 8.1 per cent, they brought in only $337 million—less 
than half the $750 million in revenue generated by lettermail. Canada Post delivers two out 
of every three parcels in Canada.
The impressive rate of growth from parcels (albeit from a low base), coupled with negative 
growth rates for lettermail, has IPC and BCG23 predicting a tipping point where most 
western postal operators would, by 2020, generate higher revenues from parcels than for 
lettermail. Unfortunately for those operators, the parcel market is usually much more 
competitive than the letter market, and the margins made by the postal operators are 
usually quite small. These trends in volume then represent a clear danger for the financial 
sustainability of postal incumbents.
We now move to the main part of this paper and present some proposals for reforms of 
the Canadian postal sector. We will come back in the concluding section to the urgency 
imposed on the reform of the sector by the declining letter volumes. 
22 Source: Canada Post Corp., annual reports, 2015 and 2014.
23 International Post Corporation and Boston Consulting Group, “Focus on.”
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4. PROPOSALS FOR REFORMS OF THE CANADIAN POSTAL SECTOR
We start with a description of the Canadian postal sector, before moving to suggestions for 
reform. 
4.1 The Canadian postal sector24
The Canadian postal sector’s organization is much closer to that of the U.S. than to 
Europe’s, combining a government-owned monopoly on the lettermail market with USO 
requiring it to deliver letters and parcels ubiquitously. The Canada Post Corporation Act 
(the CPC Act), enacted in 1981, transformed the Post Office Department into a government-
owned corporation. As such, it is subject to the Financial Administration Act of 1984, 
which states that Crown corporations are ultimately accountable, through a minister, to 
Parliament for the conduct of their affairs. While Canada Post25 has a degree of corporate 
autonomy, government maintains substantial control: Canada Post is overseen by a 
chairman and nine other directors who are named by the responsible minister, and the 
president is appointed by the governor-in-council.
Section 5(2)(b) of the CPC Act specifies for CPC “the need to conduct its operations on a 
self-sustaining financial basis while providing a standard of service that will meet the needs 
of the people of Canada and that is similar with respect to communities of the same size.” 
Although mostly silent on how CPC was supposed to attain financial self-sustainability, the 
act specifically allowed CPC to participate in related competitive markets (such as parcel 
post) and extend its services to related areas (such as e-post).
The CPC Act confers an exclusive statutory monopoly on Canada Post with respect to the 
collection, transmission, and delivery within Canada of letters not weighing more than 
500 grams. The monopoly is subject to a number of exemptions, including delivery of 
magazines, books, and electronically or optically transmitted material, and urgent letters 
subject to a fee at least equal to “three times the regular rate of postage payable for delivery 
in Canada of similarly addressed letters weighing fifty grams.” Work-sharing is less 
developed than in the U.S., although Canada Post has since 1984 offered clients incentives 
for pre-sorting their mail (under the commercial name of “incentive lettermail”).
The Canadian Postal Service Charter26 contains a description of the USO imposed on 
Canada Post. They include: the classical ubiquity requirements (“Canada Post will provide 
a service for the collection, transmission and delivery of letters, parcels and publications. 
The provision of postal services to rural regions of the country...”); uniform-pricing 
requirements (“Canada Post will charge uniform postage rates for letters of similar size and 
weight, so that letters to Canadian addresses will require the same postage, regardless of 
the distance to reach the recipient.”); affordable-pricing requirements; frequent- (five days 
a week) and reliable-delivery requirements (with speed objectives within communities, 
24 The main sources for this section are E.M. Iacobucci, M.J. Trebilcock and T. D. Epps, “Rerouting the Mail: Why Canada 
Post is Due for Reform,” C.D. Howe Institute Commentary 243 (2007); and Lee, “Is the Cheque.”
25 We will interchangeably use Canada Post and CPC in the rest of the document.
26 Canadian Postal Service Charter, available at http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/mediaroom/infosheets-canadapost-1770.htm.
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provinces and between provinces); requirements for convenient access to postal services 
(a post office must be located within 15 kilometers of 98 per cent of Canadians); and other 
constraints. 
In the 1980s, Canada Post was struggling to meet its statutory objectives, and reduced the 
frequency of mail delivery in rural areas from six to five days, a frequency applied to urban 
deliveries since 1969. Delivery to businesses was also progressively reduced to once a day. 
Other steps included converting some post offices to privately owned, franchised operations 
that offer retail postal services along with other goods and services, and the closure of some 
post offices. CPC also introduced community mailboxes in new subdivisions, an important 
move that we will revisit shortly. These measures, while successful at the time to ensure 
that CPC turned a profit, faced a lot of opposition, especially in rural areas. In 1994, the 
government declared an indefinite moratorium on closing and/or converting corporately 
operated post offices in rural Canada. This moratorium is still in place today, with 40 per 
cent of retail postal outlets currently managed through private-sector dealers.
The 1999 Framework Agreement established a quasi-contractual relationship between 
the government and Canada Post. The agreement set a five-year timetable to reach stated 
financial goals and established a price-cap formula for first-class mail that allowed Canada 
Post to increase the price of a stamp by a rate no more than two-thirds of the increase 
in the consumer-price index. The government also rejected the 1996 Mandate Review’s 
recommendation to force CPC to subsist from activities in competition with private firms 
and confirmed that CPC would not be required to divest Purolator, its courier and parcels 
subsidiary.
By the time CPC produced its next strategic review, in 2008, it had been generating a profit 
for 13 straight years. At the same time, we detailed in section 3.2 how Canada Post has 
been facing falling mail volumes, like its counterparts all over the developed world. These 
falling volumes are likely to continue into the near future, as the business and government 
sectors, which account for 90 per cent of Canada Post’s lettermail and addressed ad 
mail volumes, have strong incentives to adopt electronic alternatives. Compounding the 
problem of volume erosion is the fact that, while mail volumes are decreasing, the number 
of addresses in Canada is rising by approximately 240,000 per year (see Figure 6 below). 
Canada is unique among western nations in that it has to face both trends at the same time, 
resulting in large decreases in average volume delivered by addressee (of the order of five to 
seven per cent per year between 2009 and 2014, according to CPC’s 2014 and 2015 annual 
reports). 
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FIGURE 6 TRANSACTION MAIL DECLINE PER ADDRESS 
To adapt to these trends, CPC asked the government in 2008 for more freedom in setting its 
prices. In January 2011, the government dropped the constraint that limited price increases 
to two-thirds of the growth in the Consumer Price Index, although rates remained under 
direct government regulation, despite CPC asking that its board of directors be authorized 
to set pricing. 
Canada Post was able to cope with the impact of falling mail volumes through incremental 
efficiencies and price increases, but fell into deficit in 2011 after 16 profitable years. The 
CPC’s action plan of December 2013 (following the Conference Board of Canada’s report 
earlier that year) contained five main initiatives to return to financial sustainability by 
2019: (i) raising prices for lettermail; (ii) moving from door-to-door delivery to community 
mailboxes; (iii) streamlining operations; (iv) franchising postal outlets, which have been 
under a continued moratorium since 1994; and (v) addressing the high cost of labour. We 
now cover these five proposals in turn.
The first one concerns the pricing flexibility required by CPC. Beyond increases in rates, 
CPC seeks the ability to set differentiated rates, according both to the type of customer 
(business, individual, mailer) and volume (single stamp, stamps in booklets and coils, 
meters).
Regarding the community-mailbox proposal, Canada is quite unique in its low proportion 
(32 per cent in 2014) of door-to-door delivery. As shown in Table 1, this is due in large part 
to the large proportion (27 per cent) of community mailboxes, generalized since the mid-
1980s, as well as the large proportion of individuals collecting their mail from a centralized 
point (25 per cent). Table 1 shows that delivery to community mailboxes would cut annual 
cost per address by more than half, compared to door-to-door delivery. CPC estimates 
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that it would save approximately $500 million annually from transferring all Canadians to 
community mailboxes. Note that this was a decision made by CPC. Lee27 states: “one can 
argue that it needed the government’s approval for this and, indeed, the government did not 
direct the corporation otherwise. Community mailboxes were introduced in a similar way 
in the mid-1980s. No formal approval was required but the government supported CPC’s 
decision as within its operational freedom to manage the postal service. But it is critical 
to note that CPC is not governed by any formal policy to deliver door-to-door service as 
part of any USO commitment (including what is defined in the Canadian Postal Service 
Charter).” Finally, as mentioned in footnote 3, Canada Post has just announced that it has 
put its plans to move to community mailboxes on hold as of November 2015, in light of the 
campaign promise of the newly elected Liberal government to keep door-to-door delivery 
where it still exists. 
TABLE 1 CPC DELIVERY IN CANADA, 2014. 
Delivery method Number of 
addresses 
Percentage 
of addresses 
Average annual 
cost per address 
Door-to-door 4,980,959 0.32 $289 
Centralized point 3,957,753 0.25 $119 
Community mailbox 4,255,859 0.27 $111 
Delivery facility 1,768,848 0.11 $58 
Rural mailbox 713,642 0.05 $189 
Total 15,677,061 1.00 $167 
Source: Canada Post Corporation, Annual Report 2014, page 35. 
The third initiative, streamlining operations, concerns (among other things) the processing 
plants. Decreases in letter volumes, together with the advent of new and more efficient 
mail-sorting technologies, probably make redundant several of the 21 plants currently active 
across the country. 
As regards the fourth CPC proposal, lifting the moratorium on franchises, Stewart-
Patterson et al.28 have found that franchises cost one-third as much to run as corporate 
offices in urban areas. Lee29 reports: “the average revenue in an urban office is about three 
times that of a typical rural office according to data CPC submitted to the Strategic Review 
in 2008. If you can save two-thirds of your average cost per post office, that represents an 
enormous savings. The cost savings from franchising are profound and will be greater with 
rural outlets than they have been with urban ones.”
This leads us naturally to the fifth point raised by CPC, namely its labour costs. CPC’s 2014 
annual report states that “the Canada Post Group of Companies is one of Canada’s largest 
workforces, with 65,000 people, including 14,000 among its subsidiaries.”30 Figure 7 reports 
the 2014 workforce by type.31 Observe that about half of CPC’s total workforce is involved 
27 
Lee, “Is the Cheque.”
28 Stewart-Patterson, Gill and Hoganson, “The Future,” 41.
29 
Lee, “Is the Cheque,” 20.
30 Canada Post Corporation, 2014 annual report, 55.
31 Source: CPC 2014 annual report.
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in collecting and/or delivering mail. Labour (including benefits) represents about 70 per 
cent of total costs. 
FIGURE 7 CPC WORKFORCE BY TYPE OF WORK
Labour issues have long posed a specific challenge for Canada Post. As reported by Lee,32 
“Throughout the 1970s, labour disruptions revealed increasing union-management conflict, 
which in turn led to dissatisfaction among citizens and elected officials. Strikes concerning 
wages and job losses due to automation occurred on a regular basis.” The labour climate 
improved later on, with no significant strikes in the decade leading to 2008. More recently, 
labour unions have criticized the move to terminate the moratorium on franchising post 
offices. The moratorium (instituted in 1994 by the Chrétien government, renewed by 
the Harper government, and mentioned in the Canadian Postal Service Charter in 2009) 
“names certain corporately operated post offices (over 3,500 post offices mostly located 
in rural Canada) that cannot be closed or moved. CPC’s corporately operated post offices 
are staffed by two bargaining groups (Canadian Postmasters and Assistants Association 
[CPAA] and Canadian Union of Postal Workers [CUPW]). CPAA staffs about 3200 offices 
mostly in rural and small-town locations. The vast majority of these offices are on the 
moratorium list. In addition, CUPW operates 495 post offices. The current moratorium 
conditions as well as the minimum number of CUPW-staffed outlet provisions (defined 
in the CUPW collective agreement) would need to change to leverage further franchising 
opportunities.”33 
CPC34 shows that the majority of its employees are over age 50. This in turn means that 
the measures considered above (decreasing delivery frequency, moving from door-to-door 
delivery to community mailboxes, franchising of postal outlets) could be accomplished, at 
least in large part, through attrition rather than layoffs. 
We now cover four different domains where we advocate changes in the Canadian postal 
sector: a rethinking of the USO, setting up an independent regulator, the introduction of 
competition, and privatization. 
32 
Lee, “Is the Cheque.”
33 ibid., 27.
34 Canada Post Corporation, 2014 annual report, 4.
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4.2 A rethinking of postal USO
USO are imposed in postal markets all over the world. Given their ubiquity and the fact 
that they generate (efficiency) costs by distorting the functioning of the market, one would 
think that their rationale is well established, and that numerous studies have balanced their 
costs and benefits. Unfortunately, this is far from true. The final objectives of the USO 
are rarely stated precisely, so it is difficult to assess whether these objectives are attained 
with the USO imposed. For instance, the 2008 EU directive mentions “the objectives of 
social, economic and territorial cohesion in the Union.” The benefits of the USO are rarely 
evaluated quantitatively, and thus cannot be compared to the costs they generate. Finally, 
there is a crying need for studies that would assess whether USO are the best instruments to 
attain those objectives.35 
For instance, although Europe has thoroughly revised its approach to the postal sector for 
the last 20 years, the very idea of universal service has remained relatively uncontested 
during the early stages of the liberalization process. The debate was not that much about the 
appropriate extent of the USO but about the most efficient (or least costly) way to make the 
obligations competitively neutral, or at least as compatible as possible with competition.
In this section, we sequentially cover several aspects of USO, starting with pricing 
requirements, and moving to ubiquity of coverage, delivery-frequency minimums, and 
minimum quality standards. We then mention the necessity to assess the indirect costs of 
USO, as when they hinder the functioning of a competitive market. We end up this section 
by discussing Canada Post’s decision to put an end to door-to-door delivery, and the need 
for USO at the telecommunication level, rather than at the postal level.
USO consist in offering a minimum package of services throughout the territory (ubiquity), 
with a minimum quality and at affordable prices. The uniformity of prices is often added to 
this list of requirements. We argue elsewhere36 that USO are first and foremost a constraint 
on pricing, since the obligation to provide service without an affordable-pricing requirement 
would be an empty constraint. The main rationale for the USO is, then, redistribution 
through prices, which are not set strictly according to efficiency considerations.
Observe that USO may imply two types of redistribution. First, towards high-cost 
customers (such as single-piece mail users) or addressees (such as rural households). This 
is achieved through uniform pricing, or whenever price differentials (between consumer 
groups) fall short of cost differentials (which are mostly driven by the addressee’s location 
and type —i.e., urban versus rural and business versus household—but also by the distance 
between sender and recipient). 
35 This is true to some extent for all network industries but even more so for the postal sector. Exceptions are: H. Cremer, M. 
De Rycke and A. Grimaud, “Cost and benefits of universal service in the postal sector,” in Managing Change in the Postal 
and Delivery Industries, ed. M.A. Crew and P.R Kleindorfer (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997); H. Cremer,  
F. Gasmi, A. Grimaud and J. J. Laffont, “Universal service: an economics perspective,” Annals of Public and Cooperative 
Economics 72 (2001), 5-43; H. Cremer, P. De Donder, F. Boldron, D. Joram and B. Roy, “Social costs and benefits of the 
universal service obligation in the postal market,” in Competition and Regulation in the Postal and Delivery Sector, ed. 
M.A. Crew and P.R. Kleindorfer (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Edgar, 2008), 23-35.
36 Cremer et al., “Social costs.”
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Second, there may be redistribution towards low-income (or otherwise needy) individuals. 
An example would be a social tariff (as in telecommunications or electricity). In the postal 
sector, the first aspect appears to be the most relevant. However, in reality, cost and income 
may be correlated, with low-income people more likely to live in rural areas, for instance. 
When viewed as redistributive pricing, USO bear some similarities with policies involving 
“public provision of private goods” or in-kind transfers. The basic feature of these policies 
is that some essentially private goods—such as education, child care or health care—are 
provided either free of charge or at (sometimes highly) subsidized prices.
Even if a case can be built in favour of redistribution through postal prices,37 it is important 
to compare the benefits generated by this obligation with its costs. The benefits generated 
are probably quite small. First, postal expenses are usually a very small part of consumers’ 
budgets. This remains true if we explicitly take into account how firms pass through 
their postal costs to customers (for instance by adding the part of banking or insurance 
fees that cover the postal costs of those firms).38 Second, the redistribution attained is far 
from perfect. Take the simplest example, where agents live in rural and urban areas, with 
much higher (delivery) postal costs in the former areas. A uniform-pricing constraint then 
represents a transfer from urban to rural customers. Such a transfer may be in line with a 
government’s objective to favour rural dwellers (whether for country planning or purely 
electoral considerations), but it will also benefit rich rural inhabitants at the expense of 
poor urban ones, which is an unfortunate characteristic. A direct transfer to poor rural 
inhabitants would help them live in remote areas without being regressive, and would thus 
be preferable. Also, the legislature can have a proper debate and determine the socially 
optimal size of these transfers, rather than having them determined by the amount of postal 
products bought by different types of consumers.
At the same time, it is well known that an efficient allocation of resources requires prices to 
be in line with costs. Redistributive prices then generate efficiency costs, which should be 
evaluated and compared to the benefits described above. 
Another facet of the USO is the ubiquity of coverage. This obligation is easy to understand 
and is often rationalized with the objective of helping national unity by enhancing social 
communications. One might wonder whether the free functioning of the market would not 
naturally lead to ubiquity of coverage. After all, one important commercial argument in 
favour of postal communications is definitely that, unlike other forms of communication, 
it can reach all households and firms in a country. One might also wonder whether an 
unconstrained, commercially oriented postal operator would choose not to cover one part 
of the country, since this move would destroy part of its comparative advantage compared 
to other communication methods. In other words, the ubiquity part of the USO may not 
actually be a binding constraint on the operator. The two-sided characteristic of the postal 
sector may also help us ascertain whether postal operators would spontaneously offer full 
37 We study in Cremer et al., “Social costs,” the circumstances under which the USO can be an optimal second-best policy 
(i.e., an efficient way to redistribute resources when policy-makers do not have the necessary information to implement 
more efficient policies such as direct transfers), especially within the sender-pays context of the postal sector.
38 In France, direct annual costs per household are estimated to be about 68 euros, while the indirect costs are of the order of 
425 euros—see Cremer et al., “Social costs.”
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coverage of the territory or not. A USO may then be efficiency-enhancing when a profit-
maximizing postal operator spontaneously sets a degree of coverage that is too low from a 
social perspective.39 
An unconstrained, commercially oriented postal operator would probably choose to 
drastically decrease the frequency of delivery in the most remote parts of the country. The 
fact that USO impose the same minimum delivery frequency (usually, five times a week) 
all over the country is then most probably a binding constraint for the USP. For instance, 
as mentioned in section 4.1, Canada Post has decreased its delivery frequency to five days 
a week in rural areas. From an economic viewpoint, it makes sense to have lower delivery 
frequencies in areas where costs are higher, and where volumes are lower (as urban 
consumers tend to receive more mail than rural ones). Minimum delivery frequencies 
not only impact the size of costs, but also their nature. As explained in section 2.1, they 
transform delivery costs (essentially labour) into fixed costs. These fixed costs in turn 
make it more difficult for the USP to react to competition. In that sense, minimum delivery 
frequencies can prove especially detrimental to social welfare, especially if pushed too 
high. 
USO also embody minimum quality requirements in the form of a minimum proportion 
of mail that has to be delivered within a given amount of time (one or three days after 
collection). One can wonder whether the benefits generated by minimum quality 
requirements are commensurate with the costs they generate. First, even if it is well known 
that markets (whether organized as monopolies or oligopolies) do not spontaneously 
provide the optimal quality mix, the observed bias is not always in the direction of low 
qualities, as firms can choose a level of quality that is too high from a social viewpoint, 
in order to dampen price competition.40 Second, even if the quality offered spontaneously 
on the market were too low, the introduction of minimum quality constraints is not always 
welfare improving, because of its impact on other dimensions of competition, such as price 
competition. Third, even if a low enough minimum quality constraint may be welfare-
improving, the constraint can also be set at a level that is too large compared to what 
consumers would want. 
There is some suspicion that it is the case in Canada. A survey reported in Stewart-
Patterson et al.41 indicates that Canadian residential and small business customers are 
willing to tolerate slower service than they now receive. What matters most to customers 
is the certainty that mail will be delivered to its intended destination. This raises a fourth 
issue with minimum quality standards: USO may regulate the “wrong” aspects of quality, 
namely frequency delivery, rather than the certainty that the mail has been received after 
a certain period. One can wonder whether setting a high delivery frequency together with 
a high minimum service speed is a form of paternalism where the public authority deems 
to enforce higher standards than those the market would spontaneously offer. If that is 
39 See Cremer et al., “Social costs.”
40 See C. Crampes and A. Hollander, “Duopoly and quality standards,” European Economic Review 39 (1995): 71-82.
41 Stewart-Patterson, Gill and Hoganson, “The Future.”
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the case, then one needs a compelling argument for this paternalism.42 One should keep 
in mind that there is another explanation for high minimum quality obligations, that is of 
a political economy nature. For instance, some European postal workers are among the 
most ardent supporters of these requirements (especially the obligation to deliver a large 
proportion of first-class mail the day after it has been collected) because they necessitate 
sorting during the night, which is paid for at a premium by the employer. If that is the 
case, then current minimum quality obligations are probably set too high from a social 
viewpoint. 
An indirect cost of certain USO is that they hinder competition. USO are usually imposed 
on a single operator. Competitors are allowed to offer products on a subset of routes. 
In order to make their offer attractive, competitors need access to the USP’s ubiquitous 
delivery network, as explained above. This means that competitors can cherry-pick the 
low-cost/high-volume areas, where they can offer products cheaper, that they deliver 
themselves, than those offered by the USP (especially if the latter is required to practice 
geographical equalization of prices, as in Canada) and ask for access to the USP delivery 
network elsewhere. This cherry-picking and the risk of an ensuing “graveyard spiral” for 
the USP (which would have to increase its prices across the board to break even, generating 
new rounds of entry on marginally profitable routes, thereby making its financing problem 
even more acute) have long been held (especially in Europe) as the main obstacle to opening 
the whole postal market to competition. If USO prevent a market opening to competition, 
one has to consider all the unrealized benefits of competition when weighing the pros and 
cons of USO. 
It is worth noting, in the Canadian context, that the constraints imposed on delivery do not 
imply that delivery has to be made door to door. As explained in section 4.1, only one-third 
of customers (roughly five-million addresses) benefit from door-to-door delivery, while 
the remaining two-thirds are served by delivery to centralized points, group mailboxes, 
delivery facilities, and rural mailboxes. Community mailboxes have been the norm in new 
subdivisions since the mid-1980s. One may wonder whether moving from door-to-door 
delivery to group mailboxes is a welfare-improving move for the country. It is certainly 
correct that door-to-door delivery is expensive, as shown in section 4.1. But observe that 
it is in dense urban settings that this cost disadvantage is the least pronounced (not only 
because of the higher density of addresses, but also because urban addresses tend to receive 
more mail than do rural ones, so postal carriers rarely have to travel far between two 
deliveries). It is also in urban areas that the space taken by group mailboxes is the most 
socially costly. This has to be taken into consideration when moving from one technology 
to the other, even if the postal operator does not have to pay these costs. 
Finally, it is important to take into consideration the benefits generated by door-to-door 
delivery, in the form of the willingness to pay for this service. One insight of the literature 
on two-sided markets is indeed that one should carefully consider which side of the market 
(senders or recipients) should pay for usage, but also for membership in the network. It may 
be the case that a sizable fraction of urban recipients would be ready to pay an annual fee in 
42 For a study of the quality and pricing of delivery services in the e-commerce sector, see C. Borsenberger et al., “Quality 
and Pricing of Delivery Services in the E-commerce Sector,” in Postal and Delivery Innovation in the Digital Economy, ed. 
M.A. Crew and T.J. Brennan (New York: Springer, 2015).
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order to continue receiving their mail at home, rather than having to travel to some distant 
group mailbox. Such an opportunity should be evaluated when weighing the pros and cons 
of door-to-door delivery. One could imagine offering a menu of contracts to recipients, 
with a higher price (in the form of a yearly membership fee, for instance) for door-to-door 
delivery, and a lower (or nil) price for delivery to community mailboxes. The price for 
door-to-door delivery should reflect the additional cost that this delivery method imposes on 
CPC, compared to delivery to community mailboxes. Finally, we observe that moving away 
from urban door-to-door delivery in Canada seems to contradict what postal operators have 
been doing in Europe, which is to leverage the opportunities offered by the very fact that 
carriers are in daily contact with a large fraction of the population, at the doorstep. 
To conclude this section, one has to take into account technological evolutions when 
setting USO. Postal USO have remained unchanged for a long time in most countries, 
and have not adapted to the fast pace of technological progress in telecommunications. It 
is time to rethink these USO in this light. For instance, the need to communicate with all 
residents of the country may sometimes be achieved more effectively with communication 
technologies other than mail, especially in the most remote areas. This raises the question 
of whether USO should be imposed at the level of communications in general, rather 
than separately for mail and for (mobile) telephony, for instance, with access to mobile 
connectivity superseding letter delivery at home everywhere. This point is especially 
relevant for a sparsely populated country like Canada. It is also in line with the federal 
government’s pledge, in its rural Canada broadband strategy, to help the 13 per cent of 
(mainly rural) Canadians without high-speed Internet to gain access within five years. To 
push the argument to its limit, one can wonder about the rationale of the (costly) ubiquity 
requirement for postal services in a population where everyone already benefits from 
Internet access. Unfortunately, there is as yet little economic literature on this subject.43 
4.3 Setting up an independent regulator
Even though the U.S. and Europe have taken widely different paths to modernize their 
postal sector, a common evolution on both continents has been the setting-up/beefing-up 
of independent postal regulators. It is clear that, even in European countries where the 
postal markets have been fully opened to competition for some years, the former incumbent 
retains a very strong position in its market. End-to-end competition has been quite limited, 
except in very specific geographical markets. The recent folding up of Whistl in the U.K. 
shows how frail the “ladder of investment” experience has been in the postal sector. With 
competitors needing access to its delivery network, the incumbent retains a large amount of 
market power.44
In this section, we first make the point that setting up an independent regulator is a 
necessity for the postal sector, even in case of public ownership of the postal incumbent. 
We then discuss the scope of this regulator (which could be set at the postal or 
43 A notable exception is A. Gautier and J-C. Poudou, “Reforming the Postal Universal Service,” Review of Network 
Economics (in press, 2015), http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/149733.
44 
An alternative would be to rely exclusively on competition law—i.e., on ex post regulation. This may be the ultimate 
objective of European policy, but the development of competition in the postal market does not seem sufficiently advanced 
at this stage to get rid of ex ante regulation—yet.
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telecommunication level), before moving to the regulation of postal prices (both final and 
access prices). Finally, we turn to the non-tariff-related aspects of regulation, including the 
incentives to cut costs and the compliance with USO. 
The U.S. and many European countries have made the choice of retaining (at least 
partial) public ownership of the incumbent postal operator. This is of course also the case 
for Canada. Even in that case, setting up an independent regulator is a necessity. The 
experience of recent decades has shown, especially in Europe, that it is most difficult for 
a government to separate its role as an owner from its role as a regulator. With the postal 
operator providing a potential source of funds for the federal budget,45 it is very tempting 
for a government to turn a blind eye on any competitive abuse by the postal operator in 
order to maximize the financial proceeds obtained as dividends. The monetary benefits the 
government obtains from any abuse of dominance by the postal firm would be very visible 
in the government treasury, while the costs to the whole economy that the abuse creates are 
diffuse and difficult to measure. Governments also perform under electoral deadlines. They 
may be tempted to time their action according to the political cycles, rather than in line 
with the long-term benefits for the nation. Separating the ownership of public corporations 
with some level of market power from the regulation of them can decrease, if not suppress 
those temptations. We also argue later on in this section that the regulator should be given 
the task of monitoring adherence to the USO, and to gather the data that would allow a 
computing of the costs and benefits of these USO in order to better inform the choice of the 
optimal level of the USO. 
An interesting question is that of the optimal scope of the regulator. The regulator could 
be devoted exclusively to the postal sector, or be more generally concerned with the (tele)
communication sector. While the U.S. has a regulator focused exclusively on the postal 
sector, European countries have, in large part, opted for regulators with a broader purview. 
Many arguments are in favour of the latter solution. First, postal operations are increasingly 
coming into competition with telecommunication activities, and a regulator encompassing 
both industries can more easily take all those relationships into account. Second, some 
problems are really better considered from a transversal viewpoint: for instance, it is 
definitely worth considering imposing USO on the whole communication sector, including 
telecommunications and the postal sector, rather than separately on its components, as 
argued at the very end of section 4.2. Third, the expertise on the postal sector is far less 
widely disseminated than that on telecommunications, and setting up a regulator with a 
broader purview may allow it to optimally use its scarce intellectual resources, in a static 
perspective, to help develop a truly postal expertise in a more dynamic perspective. The 
only drawback of a unique regulator for postal and telecommunications is the risk of 
applying to the former sector ready-made solutions and procedures developed for the latter, 
without taking into account the specificities of the postal sector. This is a risk that has to be 
taken into account, but the European experience shows that many regulators have managed 
to reap the benefits of a single telecommunication regulator without falling prey to that 
prejudice. 
45 As noticed by CPC in its 2008 strategic review, “the Corporation has produced ... more than $1 billion paid to the 
Government in the form of revenue from taxes, dividends and return of capital.”
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We now move to how the postal operator should be regulated, starting with its pricing 
decisions. Industrial organization has for a long time studied how to regulate firms with 
market power (see the seminal work by Laffont and Tirole,46 among others). A characteristic 
of network sectors is the presence of a large fixed cost corresponding to the setting-up and 
maintenance of the network. We have seen in Section 2.1 that the postal “network” has two 
specificities: first, it is made mainly of people, rather than capital investment; and, second, it 
is due in large part to the imposition of USO (such as the obligation of providing ubiquitous 
delivery at a minimum frequency) complemented by constraints on the labour contracts. 
In this context, the objective of the regulator should be to induce the regulated firm to post 
welfare-maximizing prices under the constraint that the firm is to break even. These prices, 
called Ramsey-Boiteux prices (after the seminal works of Ramsey47 and Boiteux)48 have 
been intensively studied by the industrial organization literature, with applications to many 
industries. An important characteristic of these prices is that they depend on the sensitivity 
of demand to prices. This in turn calls for differentiated prices across postal products, 
even across products sharing the same production costs, provided that their demand 
characteristics are different. This is important to realize, because regulators have more 
often than not been skeptical, if not opposed to, price differentiation. This argument also 
shows that the uniformity of prices, often imposed as part of the USO, does have efficiency 
costs.49
How can a regulator induce the regulated firm to post these Ramsey-Boiteux prices? 
By imposing a price cap on the firm, where the firm would otherwise be free to choose 
its prices, provided that a weighted average of these prices does not exceed a cap. By 
adequately choosing the weights as well as the cap, the regulator can induce a profit-
maximizing firm to choose the socially optimal set of prices. This regulation formula is 
surprisingly general and robust to many variations. For instance, Borsenberger et al.50 show 
that it is robust to the introduction of uncertainty on the future demand for postal products, 
and remains the optimal regulatory formula even when the government puts different 
weights on different types of consumers (such as firms and households, for instance). It is 
worth noting that the formula should include all products sold by the firm, including its 
access products (in other words, the rebates accorded to the mailers who pre-sort the mail 
delivered by the USP). 
The exercise of market power may take forms other than high prices. The firm may, for 
instance, have insufficient incentives to lower costs. The literature on regulation has been 
aware of this for a long time, and has studied how to induce firms to be cost efficient.51 It 
is worth stressing that firms usually have much more information (both on their costs and 
on the demand they face) than do governments. Delegating the task to regulate a sector 
to an independent entity allows the regulator to bridge part of this gap, by tapping into 
46 
J.J. Laffont and J. Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993). 
47 F. Ramsey, “A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation,” Economic Journal 37 (1927): 47-61. 
48 M. Boiteux, “Sur la Gestion des Monopoles Publics astreints à l’Equilibre Budgétaire,” Econometrica 24 (1956): 22-40.
49 See P. De Donder, H. Cremer, J.P. Florens, A. Grimaud and F. Rodriguez, “Uniform Pricing and Postal Market 
Liberalization,” in Future Directions in Postal Reform, ed. M. Crew and P. Kleindorfer (Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2001), 141-163.
50 Borsenberger et al., “Price Cap.”
51 
See Laffont and Tirole, Competition, for an application to the telecommunication industry.
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the expertise of a select group of people with specific knowledge of the industry, which is 
another reason to favour setting up a regulator. But this asymmetry of information will not 
disappear even with the best-informed regulators. A consequence, as shown by Laffont and 
Tirole,52 is the necessity to leave some rents to the regulated firm, in order to induce it to cut 
costs. 
The regulator should also devote resources and attention to the USO. First, it should monitor 
whether the regulated postal operator complies with all USO. This requires yearly measures 
of the performance of the firm, such as for instance the proportion of mail of different 
classes delivered within a set period to different parts of the country. It is important that 
these measures be taken by an independent party, and not solely by the postal operator. 
Second, the regulator would be best placed to provide the elements necessary to compute 
the (private and social) costs of the USO. The private costs of the USO are the profitability 
costs for the operator of having to fulfil those obligations, such as the cost of maintaining a 
delivery network throughout the country, with a minimum delivery frequency. The social 
costs are more complex to compute, because they are not borne directly by the regulated 
firms, but by other actors, competitors and customers. For instance, USO create fixed costs, 
which require prices to be higher than they would be otherwise. Or, uniformity of prices 
results in misallocations, since prices cannot reflect marginal costs. USO also create social 
costs when they prevent competition from occurring, for instance when the existence of 
USO and the necessity to fund their costs results in the creation of “reserved areas” for the 
USP, where no competition is allowed. An important objective given to the regulator should 
be to provide the authorities with the best estimates of the (direct and indirect) costs of the 
USO in order to allow these authorities to ascertain whether these costs are the most cost-
effective ways to attain the authorities’ stated objectives (be they redistribution, national 
cohesion, coping with network externalities, etc.), and in the case of a positive answer, 
to decide upon the optimal extent of the USO, and to assess their compatibility with the 
opening of the postal market to competition. 
Setting up an independent regulator is, of course, no panacea. There is a tension between 
the necessity of staffing the regulator with people knowledgeable about the regulated 
industry, and the proximity between regulator and industry. People who staff the regulator 
do not spend their entire career there, and the “revolving door” phenomenon gives them 
incentives to be lenient with the regulated firms. In other words, there is the risk of 
“regulatory capture” by the regulated industry.53 And, because of asymmetric information, 
even the best-informed and best-run regulator cannot replicate the results that would 
have been obtained in a perfectly competitive setting. But since such a setting is anyway 
unattainable in the postal sector (because of USO, the existence of fixed costs, etc.), setting 
up an independent regulator is very complementary to the introduction of competition, to 
which we now turn. 
52 
Laffont and Tirole, Competition.
53 
See J.J. Laffont and J. Tirole, “The politics of government decision-making: A theory of regulatory capture,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics (1991): 1089-1127.
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4.4 The introduction of competition
Ever since Adam Smith, economists have been studying the benefits created by 
competition, which is at the root of the “invisible hand” guiding markets toward the 
maximization of social welfare. Competition has both static benefits (pushing prices toward 
marginal costs) and dynamic benefits (inducing firms to cut costs and to be on the lookout 
for new products). There is no doubt that some competition is beneficial in the postal 
market. At the same time, the very characteristics of the postal markets, and not the least 
the USO, prevent this market from being purely competitive, with a large number of firms 
competing for the patronage of an equally large number of consumers. The rule of the game 
in organizing the postal market is then to allow for the maximum amount of competition 
compatible with the financial viability of the socially optimal level of USO. 
We have seen that competition takes two forms in the postal sector. Competition is called 
“upstream” when it concerns the collection, sorting and transportation of mail. This form 
of competition happens on both sides of the Atlantic, although it is called “work-sharing” 
in the U.S. and “access competition” in Europe (since competitors need access to the 
incumbent’s delivery network). Two things are remarkable with upstream competition. 
First, it happens even when the law endows the incumbent with a monopoly on delivery, 
as in the U.S. or Canada. In that sense, the postal sector in the U.S. has benefited a lot 
from competition, since work-sharing represents three-quarters of domestic mail volumes. 
Second, work-sharing is provided both by customers of the incumbent postal operators 
(such as large firms, banks, insurance companies, etc.) and also by competitors (namely, 
firms that specialize in the activity of collecting, sorting and/or transporting mail to the 
delivery premises of the incumbent). The U.S. work-sharing industry is very lively, and has 
allowed the postal sector to be very competitive for these activities. Canada Post has offered 
clients incentives for pre-sorting their mail (“incentive lettermail”) since 1984. 
End-to-end competition, which includes delivery as well as the upstream activities, is 
much less common, for several reasons. First, it can be downright forbidden, as in the U.S. 
and Canada. Second, even in countries where downstream competition is allowed (as in 
the European Union), it rarely occurs throughout the country. Delivery costs vary a lot 
across geographical areas, mainly as a function of their density and of their topological 
characteristics (mountains, enclaves, etc.). Competitors can choose to “access” or “bypass” 
the USP delivery network, comparing for each area their delivery costs with the USP’s, and 
choosing the least expensive. 
Letting the competitor choose where to deliver and where to access the incumbent’s 
delivery network would improve social welfare if the incumbent’s prices reflected the social 
costs of these activities. In that case, the competitor would provide its own delivery in areas 
where its delivery costs are lower than the incumbent’s, and would use the incumbent’s 
delivery network where the latter is more cost effective. But the incumbent’s prices rarely 
perfectly reflect its marginal upstream and downstream costs, for at least two reasons. First, 
the requirement to break even, coupled with the existence of fixed costs (in large part due 
to USO), requires the USP to post a mark-up over its marginal costs. Second, the USO often 
incorporates an obligation to post uniform prices. When USP prices are not fully in line 
with marginal costs, the decision by competitors to access or to bypass the USP delivery 
network need not be socially optimal. Especially, with uniform prices, the competitors are 
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induced to cherry-pick and to deliver in low-cost (urban) areas while accessing the USP 
network in high-costs (rural) areas. This may create a “graveyard spiral,” where the USP 
loses its high-margin delivery areas but retains the areas where its delivery cost is high, 
forcing it to increase its price across the board (if subject to uniform-pricing requirements) 
and creating a new wave of competitors able to bypass the USP. In other words, uniform 
pricing and end-to-end competition do not get along well with each other, and governments 
would do well to reassess the need to impose uniform-pricing requirements if they want to 
reap the benefits from end-to-end competition. 
The dangers of selective access and of cherry-picking have to be taken into account when 
setting the access-charge level. The experience of the U.K. is very instructive. There are 
two pricing options for access, based on delivery coverage: National access and Zonal 
Access. National Access pricing provides a uniform access price (according to item format 
and weight) for competitors whose posting profile is both nationwide and consistent with 
the average Royal Mail geographical mix of mail for delivery throughout the U.K. Zonal 
Access pricing provides access prices that are differentiated across four zones (Urban, 
Suburban, Rural/Deep Rural, and London). Such a price schedule is very useful to prevent 
cream-skimming from occurring. Indeed, observe that the majority of access mail in the 
U.K. is carried by Royal Mail under National pricing plans and only a small minority under 
Zonal pricing plans.
We also observe from the European experience that competitors mostly offer lower-quality 
services compared to the incumbent, at a lower price. These offerings may of course 
increase social welfare, since they enlarge the range of services on offer to consumers. 
Also, this observation is in line with the “ladder of investment” theory, with competitors 
ramping up the quality of their offer as they start to improve their operations. At the same 
time, this type of entry may occur because the incumbent is prevented from offering 
these products due to the minimum quality requirements embedded in USO. If this is the 
case, then entry may not be socially optimal, since entrants are indeed protected from the 
competition of the USP by the imposition of USO on the latter! We have seen in section 4.2 
that many Canadians would welcome lower quality standards if that could decrease postal 
prices. 
Taking a broader perspective, postal operators are already in competition with firms from 
the media and telecommunication industries. This competitive pressure, which results 
in lower letter volumes delivered, is used as an argument by postal operators to relax the 
USO imposed on them. For instance, there is currently an academic debate as to whether 
price caps remain the best instruments to regulate the USP’s prices in that context.54 This 
competitive pressure from outside the industry also induces USPs to reduce their cost.55 
54 See C. Borsenberger, S. Bréville, H. Cremer, P. De Donder and D. Joram, “Price Cap”; and T. Brennan and M. Crew, 
“Price cap regulation and declining demand” (paper presented at the 23rd Conference on Postal and Delivery Economics, 
Vouliagmeni, Greece, June 3–6, 2015).
55 
For state-of-the-art studies on the efficiency of postal networks, using non-parametric methods, see C. Cazals, P. Dudley, 
J.-P. Florens, S. Patel and F. Rodriguez, “Delivery offices cost frontier: a robust non parametric approach with exogenous 
variables,” Review of Network Economics 7, 2 (2008).
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The main message of this section, then, is that competition should be welcomed, provided 
that the USO are devised to allow the incumbent to compete on a “level playing field” with 
its competitors. This requires first that USO not be overly restrictive. Uniform-pricing 
requirements (for final prices as well as access charges) are especially detrimental to 
competition, potentially leading to cherry-picking. Minimal quality requirements can also 
open the door to inefficient entry, when USO restrict the type of mail that the USP can 
offer.
Opening the market to competition must be accompanied by measures to ensure the 
financial viability of the USO. Various measures have been introduced in different 
countries. Following the example of the telecommunication industry, one can impose “pay-
or-play” regulations: either competitors assume their share of the USO, or they contribute 
to a fund whose objective is to compensate the USP for the USO costs. The taxation of 
competitors to fund the financial cost of the USO has been studied by De Donder, Cremer 
and Rodriguez.56 One could imagine auctioning off the right to deliver in certain areas, 
trading-off competition in the market for competition for the market. 
4.5 Privatization
The privatization of the incumbent postal operator is sometimes considered as part of the 
rethinking of the postal sector. It is important to stress from the outset that privatization 
is not a substitute to the opening of the postal market to competition, but may rather be 
considered as a complement, since a private monopoly need not be more friendly to social 
welfare than a public one.
The international experience varies a lot in that regard. The public ownership of the 
USPS is rarely questioned in the U.S. The various European directives are silent about the 
ownership of postal incumbents, and European countries have followed different paths, 
the majority having kept (at least partial) public ownership of the incumbent, while others 
(such as Germany, the Netherlands, and more recently, the U.K.) have privatized the postal 
incumbent.
The main economic rationale for privatization of an incumbent postal operator (as well as 
in other industries) is the difficulty of a government to efficiently run a firm, for several 
reasons. Firms are run by professional managers, who have more information regarding 
the costs and demand characteristics of the firm they run than its owners do. The modern 
economic literature has thus studied the interplay between managers and owners as a 
“principal-agent” problem, where the principal (the owners) tries to induce its agent (the 
managers) to behave in a way which benefits the principal, in a context where the agent 
benefits from asymmetric information compared to that of the principal. Such a problem 
is present also for private firms, but is made more complex by several characteristics 
of public ownership. First, the owners of a private firm usually have a single and clear 
objective (maximizing profit, or the value of the firm) while governments usually have 
multiple, and potentially conflicting (political and social) objectives, such as encouraging 
56 
P. De Donder, H. Cremer and F. Rodriguez, “Funding the Universal Service Obligation under Liberalisation,” in Postal 
and Delivery Services: Pricing, Productivity, Regulation and Strategy, ed. M. Crew and P. Kleindorfer (Boston: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2002), 31-53.
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economic growth, employment, regional development, macroeconomic stability, etc. 
The simultaneous presence of multiple objectives and of asymmetric information opens 
up many possibilities for the firm’s stakeholders (management, but also employees and 
their unions, etc.) to capture rents while claiming to follow one of the multiple objectives 
assigned to their firm. Second, even in the case of a single objective (such as maximizing 
social welfare, subject to the firm breaking even), it is more complex to measure the 
performance of the firm with respect to this objective than it is to measure profits or the 
value of a private firm. Here also, the difficulty in measuring performance (how does one 
evaluate the amount of social welfare attained, and whether this amount is close enough to 
the maximum attainable?) opens up possibilities to capture rents. Third, in democracies, 
representatives of the citizens are elected for limited terms, so that we have another 
principal-agent relationship, between citizens and their elected representatives. The time 
horizon of the latter is often limited to their elected term, which in turn means that they 
may give shortsighted instructions to the public firms’ managers. Fourth, and in part 
because managers and stakeholders understand well the elected representatives’ objectives 
and constraints, the credibility of the instructions given by these representatives is not 
always well established. The best example of this problem is the “soft budget constraint” 
faced by many firms; while stakeholders in privately run firms know that their firm will 
disappear if it does not break even on a regular basis, such a threat is much less credible 
for public firms, where a variety of reasons (related to the unwillingness of elected 
representatives to let a firm disappear under their watch) may explain why a public firm in 
dire straits would be bailed out by the authorities. The perception of a soft budget constraint 
may then induce the unions, for instance, to take a harder stance in negotiations, and may 
result in multiple strikes, and/or overly generous labour contracts. Finally, even if all those 
problems are solved, and if the public firm is run to maximize social welfare, this firm will 
interact with private competitors. The study of the interactions between a small number of 
firms with different objectives (such as profit maximization for private firms and welfare 
maximization for public firms) is undertaken in the “mixed oligopoly” literature. This 
literature is rife with paradoxes, where aggregate social welfare would be higher if all firms 
maximized profits, rather than if one firm maximized welfare and all others profits.57 
Note that the long list of problems associated with public ownership does not mean that 
the only way to solve them is to privatize the incumbent. There exist ways to tackle these 
problems without resorting to privatization. Take the example of the soft budget constraint. 
This problem has mostly been solved in Europe by the prohibition of public transfers 
to public firms, except in very specific circumstances. The European Commission and 
European courts pay a great deal of attention to this provision of European treaties. Also, 
private ownership does not always solve all problems, and may create others. For instance, 
the privatization of postal incumbents in Europe has created some desire to build “national 
champions,” namely firms that benefit from lenient regulatory oversight at home, in order to 
build a strong national base and to compete aggressively abroad.
57 
See P. De Donder, “L’entreprise publique en concurrence: les oligopoles mixtes,” Revue Française d’Economie XX (2005): 
11-50, for a survey of this literature; and P. De Donder and J. Roemer, “Mixed oligopoly equilibria with endogenous firms’ 
objectives,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 27, 3 (2009): 414-423, for a study of a mixed oligopoly 
situation when all firms have multiple objectives.
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An argument often given in favour of privatization is that it brings much-needed money 
to the public coffers. Recall that the value of a firm is the discounted sum of its future 
(expected) profits. There are, then, two reasons why the amount offered by private investors 
may be large enough to convince authorities to sell: first, if future profits are higher under 
private than under public ownership and, second, if public and private discount rates differ. 
One has to be cautious in both cases. Starting with the latter, elected representatives may be 
more impatient than private investors are because of a much-reduced time horizon, limited 
to the next election. In that case, selling the public firm may not be in the best interests of 
citizens. As for the former case, one must look at the source of the higher private profits. If 
they come from, for instance, increased efficiency, then privatization represents a sort of 
“double dividend” (inflow of money for the authorities, and higher efficiency in the postal 
sector). If, however, higher profits come from the ability to escape regulations (because of 
the lack of an independent regulator, or because it is not sufficiently funded, or is staffed 
with insufficiently knowledgeable agents, for instance), then privatization looks much less 
promising. Finally, observe that all postal operators are operating in a context of decreasing 
letter volumes. It is still unclear at this point whether this trend will continue unabated, 
and at what level letter volumes may stabilize (if they do stabilize at all). At the same time, 
parcel volumes are increasing, but they usually bring less profit to the postal operator both 
because they still represent lower volumes than letters do, and because the parcel industry 
has traditionally been more competitive than letters in most developed countries, so that 
the profit per parcel is usually quite low. Given this uncertainty about the evolution of the 
profitability of the postal sector, it is far from certain that governments would be able to 
obtain a sizable amount for a postal incumbent.
European directives take no stand on the ownership status of the incumbent postal 
operator because different countries may prefer different options, according to their own 
sensitivities. The privatization of a postal operator is no panacea. More precisely, the case 
for keeping (at least partial) public ownership is stronger in countries where the quality of 
public institutions is high enough that the various agency problems mentioned above can be 
solved with public regulatory oversight. A successful public firm must then be given clear 
objectives and must be allowed to have an arm’s-length relationship with its public owner. 
Managers of public firms should be given freedom to run the business efficiently. At the 
same time, for the reasons explained in section 4.3, the incumbent (public or private) postal 
operator should be scrutinized by an independent regulator.
Privatization may be considered at the same time as the market is opened to competition, 
but a case can be made to proceed sequentially, opening to competition first, reorganizing 
the public firm, and then privatizing it later. This is the route followed by the U.K., where 
the postal market has been fully open to competition since 2006, but where Royal Mail was 
only privatized in October 2013. Observe that 10 per cent of the shares have been kept aside 
(for free) for Royal Mail’s more than 150,000 employees, which has facilitated the transition 
from public to private ownership.58 
58 
The privatization has not affected the Post Office, which is now a separate company from Royal Mail. The government says 
it wants to invest more money in the Post Office network to prevent branch closures and eventually set it up as a mutual 
business.
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5. CONCLUSION
The postal sector is in evolution in many parts of the world. The European Union has 
been reorganizing its postal sector for close to two decades, and has opened it fully 
to competition since the end of 2012. This move has been accompanied by setting up 
independent regulators and, in some countries, by the privatization of the postal incumbent. 
The evolution in the U.S. has been less visible, with the transformation of the Postal Rate 
Commission into the Postal Regulatory Commission, with enlarged duties to regulate the 
USPS, which has been granted additional freedom of decision.
Until the mid-2000s, letter volumes in most developed countries evolved in line with 
economic activity. With the advent of electronic substitutes to mail, letter volumes have 
been decreasing in most countries ever since. This structural decline is pronounced, 
continuing, and may even be accelerating, so that it is difficult to tell at what level letter 
volumes will stabilize. At the same time, the growth in transactions over the Internet 
(e-commerce) has translated into large increases in parcel volumes, but this market is 
not yet large enough to compensate for the loss of letter volumes. These evolutions raise 
profound questions for the future of the postal sector. They also make the problem of 
reforming the sector more urgent, as delaying will only increase the problems being faced, 
including the financial viability of the USO and of CPC.
Canada Post also faces these trends, and has problems of its own. For instance, CPC is 
faced with an increase in the number of addressees while the letter volumes it delivers 
decrease. Also, the funding of the pensions of a large workforce will become increasingly 
difficult as letter volumes continue to plummet. The problem of pension funding is beyond 
the scope of this paper, but should be kept in mind when discussing the future of Canada 
Post.
The recent experience in Europe, and to a lesser extent the U.S., allows us to make 
recommendations for the Canadian postal sector. The European postal sector (and its 
customers) have benefited from the introduction of competition. This competition has 
mostly taken the form of upstream competition, where competitors perform the collection, 
sorting and transportation of mail, which is then brought for delivery to the incumbent. 
Such a form of competition has a very long history in the postal sector, especially in the 
U.S. End-to-end competition, where the competitor also does its own delivery, is rarer and 
often confined to specific urban areas. The “ladder of investment” theory, which predicts 
that competitors will move from access to bypass (i.e., building their own delivery network) 
as time passes has not received much empirical confirmation as yet.
This competition has proved compatible with the financial viability of USO. Different 
countries have experienced with various ways to fund these obligations. At the same time, 
the need to finance these obligations explicitly (rather than through hidden cross-subsidies 
between activities performed by the USP) has added pressure to re-evaluate the costs and 
benefits of the USO, which is an excellent development.
36
These evolutions have been made possible by the setting-up (or the reinforcement) of 
independent regulators. These regulators form the cornerstone of the postal sectors in 
Europe and in the U.S. They are increasingly building their interventions on recent, sound 
economic research, using for instance price caps to regulate the pricing practices of the 
postal incumbents. This approach also allows giving the postal operator as much flexibility 
as possible to ensure the financial viability of the USO in a context of decreasing demand. 
In the case of CPC, this flexibility should definitely include the ability to choose its prices 
(subject to a price-cap formula set by the regulator), to franchise its postal outlets, and to 
adapt its labour force (including by attrition) to its activity level. 
These movements have been accompanied in a minority of European countries by the 
privatization of the postal incumbents. This movement is still ongoing, with the recent 
privatization of Royal Mail in the U.K. It is difficult to draw conclusions from these 
changes, both because they are recent and because they have taken place at a moment 
where the postal sector has been in flux. This drives us to recommend a “wait and see” 
approach on privatization. 
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